1.
Introduction
Tectonic hazards can be defined as natural events, seismic
or volcanic, which potentially pose a threat to human life and property
(Nagle). Tectonic hazards are distributed around the world, appearing at
divergent, convergent, collision and transform boundaries with some intraplate
or hotspot. Therefore the majority of earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunami’s may
pose a threat to human life and property at some point, particularly as
populations grow alongside urban expansion.
A
natural hazard is not necessarily a natural disaster, for example The Mid-Atlantic Ridge is away from human settlements and
does not pose a risk. The Degg model (Figure 1.) highlights that a
hazard only becomes a disaster that needs management when it comes into contact
with vulnerable populations.
Therefore, there is a need, or lack thereof, for a range of
management strategies implemented at international, national and local levels
by a multitude of key players such as Governments, NGO’s and the scientific
community (USIDR). There are three core management strategies “Do Nothing,
Adjust, Leave”. Do Nothing is an appropriate strategy in the case of the Mid
Atlantic Ridge. Adjustment is the term for mitigation schemes such as seismic
buildings, whilst Leave refers to temporary or permanent evacuation or
abandonment of risk areas, as in the case of Montserrat in 1995. The capacity
to implement management schemes is dependent on various factors such as
economic development, government commitment and frequency of hazards.
Management is a multi-pronged approach that
is arguably interconnected, occurring before, during and after a hazardous
event. The traditional model in Figure 2. shows there is a cyclical and
interconnected nature to effective management. This will provide a framework
for the report, divided into subsections illustrating contrasting, different
strategies.
Case studies in the report illustrate management schemes
before, during and after. The oldest, however classic example, was the 1995
Kobe earthquake which illustrated long term management of over 20 years whilst
the 1995 Soufriere Hills eruption highlighted an LEDC with advanced prediction
methods and a “leave” strategy. The 2004 Indonesian tsunami
was an example of poor before management yet enhanced mitigation in the
aftermath whilst the 2005 Kashmir earthquake similarly
illustrates the effect of a lack of prevention in terms of seismic buildings.
The 2010 Eyjafjallajökull volcanic eruption was used to highlight fully domestic responses
whilst the 2010 Haiti earthquake was an example of external, international
relief efforts. The Tohoku 2011 earthquake is an excellent
example of secondary hazards in the form of a tsunami and Japanese mitigation
techniques, whilst the contrasting 2013 Solomon Islands tsunami illustrated
inadequate infrastructure. Contemporary examples
such as the 2013 Pakistan earthquake exhibited a lack of prediction whilst the
2014 Chile earthquake highlights the capacity of an LEDC to have stringent
seismic codes, the 2014 Mount Sinabung eruption highlights management during as
the activity is ongoing.
The Park model (figure 3.) shows deterioration occurs during a hazard yet
it highlights the chance for subsequent improvement after. The Park Model shows
the point at which mitigation techniques can be applied for improvement to
increase a county’s capacity to cope. However, improvement may not be available
or achievable for all nations, namely Haiti who are still in the deterioration
stage. Management strategies need to be effectively implemented and enforced to
lead to progression.
2.
Methodology
To facilitate this report a wide breadth of sources were
used. Internet websites such as up to date, journalistic BBC News and the
Guardian were used for contemporary case studies. However, these may have
included some bias so were used in conjunction with Medicines Sans Frontier.org,
USGS and livescience to eliminate personal opinion bias. When researching
management schemes using key player websites was effective as they were
actively part of the response. Text books including Dunn et al were used for
models whilst reliable academic resources such as Geography Review,
Geofactsheet 30 and Geofile 133 contributed to research. However, government
websites were not used due to potential bias, dishonesty or political motives.
Quantitative and qualitative sources were used simultaneously to provide
objective and in depth valid data. A range of data was used for comparability
for example whilst an unreliable blog reported the death toll of the Tohoku Earthquake
in 2011 as 18,000, Geography Review, a more reliable source, reported 16,000. Amongst
written sources documentaries such as Ian Stewarts “Top 10” and BBC horizon
“Japan Earthquake” were used to collate an extensive range of sources to
eliminate bias and discrepancies.
3.
Analysis
3.1
Before
Management strategies are crucial before
the disaster has occurred, to minimise the economic and human losses. However,
governments and the scientific community hold most responsibility in management
before an event (ISPUB).
3.1.1
Risk Assessment
Risk assessments, identifying areas and people
that may be at risk of a disaster before a disaster occurs, are essential. The
Hyogo Framework (a UN global blueprint for disaster risk reduction) suggests “Governments
must know the risks they face in order to supply effective reduction
strategies”.
i.
Earthquake and Tsunami Risk Assessment
This involves assessing durability and safety of structures, vulnerable
populations such as elderly or disabled, economic structure and capacity to
cope. For example Japan carried out a risk assessment on the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear plant in 2007 and
concluded there was a 10% risk of a tsunami breaching the 6 metre wall however
the 2011 tsunami caused by the earthquake was 14 metres high (Geography Review)
suggesting risk assessments cannot predict the severity of an earthquake or
tsunami.
ii.
Volcanic Eruption Risk Assessment
In
addition, volcano risk assessment includes devising an exclusion zone and the
proximity of airports as volcanic ash can severely disrupt flights, as in the
case of 195,000 flights during the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull eruption. Once risk
assessment is completed management strategies aimed at modifying the event and
the vulnerability can be implemented.
3.1.2
Prediction
Prediction is a strategy that
despite involving costly, technical equipment and ultimately there is an
inability to fully predict an earthquake or eruption, provides a chance for
governments to foresee an event; it is crucial for providing early warnings
that save lives. There is a multitude of prediction methods. For example Japan
has an extensive network of seismometers called the JMA (Japanese
Meteorological Agency) which monitor primary and secondary waves which helped predict
the Tohoku earthquake (Top 10). Whereas Pakistan, due to finance and the
presence of the Taliban, has little prediction or monitoring, which contributed
to the high death toll of 350 in the 2013 earthquake, as the area around the
Chaman fault is too dangerous for scientists to monitor due to the terrorist
situation at present (livescience). A
lack of prediction means events are completely unprecedented therefore rescue
efforts will be slower, prediction equates time which is crucial with a tectonic
hazard.
i.
Prediction Methods
A historic strategy is monitoring animal behaviour which is mainly used in
LEDC’s such as Pakistan, as reliance on agriculture means more awareness of
anomalous behaviour, which can signify tremors as animals can feel minor
foreshocks.
Also, technical strategies used by Montserrat Volcano Observatory such as measuring
increased levels of sulphur dioxide and satellite images to monitor bulges in a
volcano’s sides. Recently prediction has incorporated prediction of tsunami’s
with the Pacific and Indian Ocean Tsunami warning systems, in response to the
2004 Indonesian tsunami, which monitor changes in pressure on the sea bed and
transmit predictions via satellites. However these facilities can produce false
predictions, which are met with hostility from local residents, for example in
2007 angry residents disabled a tsunami early warning system in the Indonesian
region due to it sending out false warnings on false predictions causing
evacuation. (theguardian)
ii.
Early Warnings
Iceland has an effective early warning system text service, as when
Eyjafjallajokull showed high gas levels in 2010, they were able to send out a
text 30 minutes prior to the eruption giving individuals time to prepare. In
contrast sirens were used to warn of further eruptions from Mount Sinabung in
2014 (USGS). It has been estimated that over 3 million lives have been saved
due to early warning systems in the last 40 years (geography review).
3.1.3
Prevention
Whilst it is impossible to prevent an earthquake or volcanic eruption it
is possible to prevent impacts
i.
Seismic Codes. “Earthquakes don’t kill
people, buildings do” (Geofactsheet 133), the vast majority of injuries, death
and economic losses come from the collapsing of buildings. Japan have invested
in seismic codes as a before strategy whose success was exemplified in Kobe. The
majority of Japan’s buildings prior to the Kobe earthquake in 1995 were built
to “kyu-tiashin” standards which could withstand some intensity however
stronger codes were introduced called “shin-tiashin”, during the earthquake
only 0.3% of shin-tiashin buildings suffered damage whilst 8.4% of kyu-tiashin
collapsed or were damaged (japanpropertycentral). In contrast in LEDC the
Solomon Islands in 2013, many buildings were made out of mud brick due to not
implementing this strategy, which collapsed due to the shaking, the subsequent
tsunami washed the entire Nela village away (BBC news). This highlights the
need for stringent, enforced and up to date seismic building codes.
ii.
Exclusion Zones
A prevention strategy for volcanic eruptions is that of exclusion zones,
this takes the “Leave” strategy as a temporary or in the case of Montserrat,
permanent exclusion zone is set up around the volcano (Geography review). This
physically prevents loss of life however displaces individuals and disrupts
livelihoods. The Southern half of the island is inaccessible to prevent deaths
in the event of a further eruption. This shows the ability of an LEDC to
implement prevention strategies, however this could be due to the island being
a British colony as 4000 residents were able to move out of the exclusion zone
to safety in Britain (theguardian)
iii.
Evacuation
Often evacuation is haphazard
(hphighcourt) or mismanaged, for example Mount Sinabung erupted in September
2013, the government evacuated the area temporarily and allowed 14,000
residents back home within 1 month. However, the volcano erupted again in
January 2014 thus people had to be evacuated again or were trapped in their homes
by the ash cloud (bbcnews). In contrast, before the earthquake in L’aquila in
2009 the government, due to predictions, organised an evacuation, however this
was abandoned. Evacuation is crucial yet often poorly managed.
Prevention is an effective way of
removing or reducing the risk however exclusion zones means the displacement of
residents and many LEDC’s cannot afford seismic buildings or their priorities
may be to tackle a day to day issue of poverty, however Chile has stringent
seismic codes which are strictly enforced.
3.2
During
Once a tectonic hazard has occurred, there
are different forms of management strategies for which success is dependent on
quick mobilisation. During a disaster, key players are most important; these
can be split into domestic such as government and international such as NGO’s. Relief ranges from locals with little
machinery responding first to those trapped under rubble which was the case in
Kashmir in 2005, to military intervention with large machines to lift rubble
used in Chile 2014. Relief strategies include rescuing survivors, creating
temporary camps for homeless, putting out secondary hazards of fires, and providing
medicines, food and water.
3.2.1
Domestic strategy
Domestic strategies are relief efforts that come from the government and
bodies within the country. The ability to deal with a disaster domestically is
rare, however Iceland’s responses to the Eyjafjallajokull earthquake in 2010
was entirely domestic (geotalk). Part of the strategy from the government was
to mobilise emergency teams to channel lava by bulldozing a main road, this
prevented lava from reaching nearby villages. Iceland is an MEDC and therefore
had the financial capacity to fund purely domestic emergency aid and strategies.
3.2.1.1 Key Players
Key players in domestic responses are predominantly governments. For example,
in the recent April 2014 Chile earthquake, President Bachelet mobilised military teams to
provide man power to physically rescue people and keep order and prevent
looting in a time of panic as security is often at risk (bbc news). The
Japanese government sought to deal with the 9.0 Tohoku earthquake domestically
and thus refused much foreign aid. A Chinese naval ship equipped with medical
supplies was refused whilst the US providing coolant to the Fukushima nuclear
plant was also refused (ENENEWS). The sheer magnitude meant domestic responses
were limited and the refusal of foreign aid may have hindered the relief stage.
A contrasting key player is that of the
individual, it is their responsibility to follow plans and seek personal safety.
However, also during the Tohoku earthquake only 58% of residents in Miyagi
sought higher ground (livescience), this meant many people were killed by the
secondary hazard due to failure to follow information in place. In the 2005
Kashmir earthquake, early relief was largely in the
hands of untrained, unequipped local people. This highlights that both large
governments and individuals are part of the domestic response during a hazard
as they are the first to respond.
3.2.2
International strategies
In contrast to domestic strategies are international strategies and
humanitarian which aim to supply emergency teams and money. International
responses come in the form of international aid from other countries for
example Britain gave $10million towards relief efforts in Haiti after the 2010
earthquake. Other strategies are charities such as Medicine’s Sans Frontier’s (MSF)
and the Red Cross who entered within 36 hours (bbcnews) and individual funding
such as the Hope for Haiti campaign and song which alone raised $58 million
(mtv.com). Due to Haiti’s poor governance, poverty and corruption there was a
lack of domestic aid and responses which caused such an influx of foreign aid
and foreign NGO’s. The international aid provided supplies, temporary camps and
large amounts of monetary aid to respond to the disaster.
3.2.2.1 Key players
Key players for an international response are governments as they provide
bilateral emergency aid but the role of NGO’s and the media is highly
important. MSF provided its largest humanitarian response to the Haiti
earthquake. NGO’s are particularly important because they can ignore political
and territorial disputes and religious ideology (Moore et al). However, during
the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, local residents who are Muslim protested
against female relief workers and male workers working with female locals due
to their beliefs. This suggests that foreign NGO’s cannot compete with domestic
responses as they do not know the local needs and customs and may supply
inappropriate aid. NGO’s were criticised for marginalising Haitian NGO’s
(thenation) and quickly creating camps that consequently created a tertiary hazard
of a cholera epidemic, this may mean Haiti may not reach the point of
improvement on the Park Model (figure 3.). This could suggest international aid
is not always the best strategy particularly as refugee camps create further
hazards, however the money accumulated by international funds is unmatched by
domestic.
Similarly, the role of the international media is beneficial. The media and
social networking sites in recent years have provided instantaneous updates on
natural disasters which in turn have prompted large campaigns such as “Pray for
Japan” and “Hope for Haiti” from around the globe. The internet and media has
facilitated more international involvement in relief phase strategies which has
contributed to funding, whilst NGO’s provide quick, humanitarian assistance as
part of their strategy to manage the immediate effects of a hazard.
3.3
After
As the Park model shows
(Figure 3.) management after a disaster is essential for returning back to
normality but also offers a chance for improvement. The Hyogo Framework
stresses the need for mitigation in this stage and incorporating disaster risk
reduction into development.
3.3.1
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
is a post disaster stage of management, it encompasses strategies to reinstate
lifelines such as water whilst supporting communities and individuals recover
from trauma.
i.
Temporary reconstruction
After the 2014 Mount Sinabung eruption five
halls, normally used for traditional cultural ceremonies were converted into
shelters with at least 1,500 being temporarily housed (bbcnews).. During the
Haiti earthquake NGO’s began setting up camps immediately, which instead of
being temporary are still in use now (publicintegrity). Temporary
reconstruction helps rebuild lifelines yet in LEDC’s it often becomes semi-permanent
thus they remain in deterioration (figure.3).
i.
Psychosocial support
Psychosocial support helps
individuals and communities to heal the psychological wounds. However, despite much of Kobe having been
completely restored physically, many communities have not. Despite being 18 years on
from the disaster, much psychological and community damage has not been
adequately repaired suggesting the need for psychosocial support (theguardian).
However, psychosocial support
has been an effective strategy after the eruption of Eyjafjallajokull in 2010.
The Icealandic Red Cross, provided counselling particularly for traumatised
children and activated a 24 hour hotline for individuals to seek psychological
support (reliefweb). It can change passive victims
into active survivors (ifrc.org).
3.3.2
Reconstruction
Reconstruction
is the stage in which permanent changes are introduced. It is at this pivotal
point that governments can implement mitigation strategies. There is a striking
contrast between the reconstruction in MEDC’s and LEDC’s as reconstruction relies
upon resources, funding and government commitment.
i.
Rebuilding
Rebuilding is only necessary for the adjust strategy not permanent leave as in
Montserrat. Strategies include rebuilding physical infrastructure, which has been successful in
Kobe after the 1995 earthquake, the restoration of lifelines, railways, roads and harbours
were focused on, and all restored to their previous states within three years (chinaup.com).
However Kobe has been at a stagnant 80% recovery since the earthquake, this
translates as all physical infrastructure has been rebuilt yet victims
livelihoods have not. The Japanese government funded $58billion towards
reconstruction. Also this wide-scale rebuilding
inevitably took time to accomplish, and in 2003, many projects were still in
the construction stages.
In contrast
rebuilding after the 2013 Solomon Islands tsunami has been successful, NGO
Anglican Overseas has provided over 500 solar panels in the reconstruction of
villages to provide sustainable energy as electricity was compromised in the
disaster. This could reflect Park’s model (figure.3) as the reconstruction
strategy here has provided improvements above former normality and contributed
to MDG 7 in providing sustainable energy.
Reconstruction can help improve societies above normality, however it is
often a long time before this is completed or recognisable.
3.3.3
Mitigation
Mitigation is both part of the Before and After stage. This involves
aspects such as insurance, The benefit of using mitigation strategies after a
disaster is strategies can be based on the downfalls of the most recent response
to provide a more prepared nation with a greater capacity to cope.
i.
Seismic building and land use zoning can be
implemented in this stage. For example LEDC
Chile, due to earthquakes from the 1960’s to 2013 has used reconstruction as a
stage for mitigation and has enforced, stringent building codes which helped
reduce the impacts of the 2014 earthquake (nbcnews.com). However, LDC Haiti has struggled
to rebuild with mitigation in mind. Much of Haiti’s rebuilding has been the
construction of makeshift, shanty towns using tarpaulin supplied during the
rehabilitation phase. Little permanent reconstruction has occurred and this
type of infrastructure is the most vulnerable to future hazards.
ii.
Mortuary sites
Tectonic hazards often produce large death tolls for example the Haiti
earthquake 2010 accrued over 316,000 deaths (CNN) and Montserrat eruption of
1995 killed 23 people (SLN.org). Nations are often underprepared for this
unprecedented amount of dead bodies, lacking mortuary sites, freezers and
burial guidelines which is often a reason for tertiary hazards of diseases. For
example during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Thailand and Indonesia lacked
burial sites and the correct refrigeration for human remains. As part of the reconstruction
phase mortuary sites can be devised and mass fatality plans to mitigate further
hazards of disease (plosmedicine).
During both rehabilitation
and reconstruction stages of the Park Model (figure 3.) are the opportunities to mitigate against
future hazards. The Hyogo Framework is a mitigation framework guiding
strategies before, during and after to manage a disaster from beginning to end.
4.0 Conclusion
Tectonic hazards frequently
coincide with human settlements meaning there is a vital need for management
strategies before, during and after a hazard to prevent, reduce and restore
human and economic losses. Due to this overlap of vulnerable populations and
hazards (Figure. 1) “adjust” and “leave” are more appropriate strategies that
incorporate methods of prediction, prevention, rescue and reconstruction. There
is such a contrast in strategies due to appropriateness of strategies for the
type of hazard, frequency and management successes reliance on economic
development and government prioritisation.
There are, however, anomalies,
Chile and Montserrat have invested in prediction and prevention strategies
despite being LEDC’s. Chile has prioritised disaster management through strict
seismic building codes (CNN), whilst Montserrat has one of the most advanced
prediction observatories in the world. This highlights how government
commitment and economic development can be mutually exclusive.
There is a cyclical nature to
disaster management, the three phases before, during and after are
interconnected as the traditional model shows (figure. 2). Without adequate
before strategies, the need for during and after strategies will be greater, as
will losses. It could be argued before and mitigation strategies are most
important as if they are successfully provided they should eliminate or reduce
the impacts of the hazard which can reduce the need for any rescue,
rehabilitation or reconstruction.
Finally, as the Hyogo Framework
states, disaster management strategies must be a priority in all development
plans, in all governmental plans and integrated into daily life to create a
culture of preparedness.
5.0 Bibliography
·
Nagle
·
Moore et al
·
Dunn et al – Phillip Alan Text Book
·
Bbcnews.co.uk
·
USIDR
·
Theguardian.co.uk
·
Medicinessansfrontiers.org
·
USGS
·
Livescience.co.uk
·
Geography Review
·
Geofactsheet 30
·
Geofile 133
·
Blogspot.com
·
Japanpropertycentral.com
·
Hphighcourt.com
·
Geotalk.com
·
ENENEWS.com
·
MTV.com
·
Thenation.com
·
Publicintegrity.org
·
Ifrc.org
·
Reliefweb.org
·
Scielo.com
·
Chinaup.com
·
Nbcnews.com
·
CNN.com
·
SLN.org
·
Plosmedicine.org
